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Abstract. This article attempts to expand the boundariesof multinationalcorporations from an
equity mode (foreigndirect investment)to a non-equity mode (franchising). Franchising by
Coca-Cola Company in Japan is investigated to revealthe mechanism of intemationalintemal
controlbetween franchisors and franchisees. The existence of an effective controlmechanism is
confirmed,while the narrow and restrictivescope of conventionaltheory is critiqued. Finally,the
necessity to consider flexible boundaries of multinationalcorporations is suggestedto understand the
realsignilicance of multinationalcorporations.
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Introduction .
Currently,gIobalservice companies,some of which use franchising to expand their
businessin foreign markets,are rapidly growing. Thosecompanies enlarge not only their
corporate brands but also power of controlin the globaIeconomy. Nevertheless, i t  canbe
thought that research on internationalfranchisecompanies hasbeen fruitlessso far.
Especially,anaIyzing intemalmechanisms of intemationalfranchisecompanies is now being
urged(Paswan,2002).
The purpose of this article is to investigatethe inside of a worldwide franchisecompany:
whether franchisors can controltheir foreignfranchisees and also how franchisors can
controlthe operation of franchisees. If the companies can effectively controlthem,this
research also implies to extend the boundaries (Coase,1937;Felstead,l993;W加iamson,
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l975) of multinationalcorporations (hereinafter MNCs) .  In order to dealwith theseques-
tions,the internaloperations of Coca-Cola Companyl in Japan are examined.
AnalyticalFramework: A Definition of MNCs
The definition of an MNC has been closelylinked withforeigndirect investment (FDI)
since Hymer's dissertation, a breakthrough,inl960. Hymer(l960)had emphasized“con-
tro「'of foreignbusinessunits(e.g.,foreignsubsidiary,foreignbranch,foreignsalesoflice and
so forth)by its headquarters,and then recognized FDI as a strong toolof control. Many
internationalbusinessscholars, such as Buckley and Casson(1976),Dunning(l988) and
Kindleberger(1969),have followedand sophisticated Hymer's conventionaldefinition of the
MNC.
A definition that emphasizesthe controlaspect of an MNC might be stillvalid. A
problem,however,is modes of control. Most of the conventionaltheories,if not all,stated
that the ownership of the equity stake of foreignbusinessunits,known as anequity mode,
constitutes controlof that unit. For instance, Jones (1996,p.5) stated that“the basic idea
that MNEs (multinationalenterprises) engage in FDI which enables them to own and control
assets in foreigncountriesis straightforward. FDI is conventionally used as a proxy to
measure the extent and direction of MNE activity.”
Howeverespecially in recent years,it has been becoming common for companiesto
exploit non-equity modes,such as strategic alliances,licensing,franchising,leasing,manage-
mentservice contracts andlong-term contracts,to expand their businessactivities and assets
acrossborders (Contractor and Kundu,1998;Erramilli et a l,2002;Quinn and Doherty,
2000). If the boundary of an MNC is simply definedbythe“flow of FDI,”the internationa1
companies that utilize non-equity modes aren't categorized as MNCs.
In contrast,if the boundary is defined in “term of control,”the outcome w加 be slightly
different from that suggested by the conventionaltheory. In other words,the possibility that
companies can tightly controltheir foreignbusinesses and assets by the useof non-equity
modes exists there,and also the companies mightberecognizedas the MNCs (seefigure1).
At any rate,it is necessary to revisit the question raised by Caves ( l996,p.1)in the past;
that is,“What constitutes'control'over a foreignestablishment is another judgmentalissue.”
Internationalbusinessscholars should positively dealwith this “judgmenta「'issue and have
to judge the realsignificance of MNCs inthe present globalsociety.
This article focuses on internationalfranchising as a typicalnon-equity mode,which is
not based on ownership,but on formalagreement between franchisors and franchisees,which
Figure1. ModalChoices and Boundaries of M・、1'Cs
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are independent businesses. Especia11y, the mechanism to controlthe foreign franchisees is
investigated here. Also, if controlthrough franchising is confirmed, it fo11ows that the
definition of MNC ought to be espanded to include non-ec1uity modes as 、ve11as e(luity modes.
In the next section, the internaland internationalbusiness process of Coca -Cola Company in
Japan is examined to clarify the relation of franchising to contro11ing.
Strategy and Control in Coca-Cola's Franchise System
“BottIing System”Based on the Franchise Agreement
It is ゙ ,e11-kno、、,n that Coca-Cola Company main1、,uses franchising, 1、nown in Japan as
the “bottling system, ” to e1、pand their business operations domestically and internationa11y.
Their so-ca11ed “business format,” consisting of their production sy、stem , expertise in
marketing and distribution, traden、ar1、, and concentrate of their drinks, is transferred to1oca1
franchisees through the franchise agreement.
Coca -Cola Company had made its first franchise agreement with two1ocalbusinessmen
of Tennessee on July21, 1899(Coca-Cola Japan Company , 1987;Pendergrast, l 993 ) . This
first600一、、'ord contract clearly became a prototype of the current more sophisticated agree -
ment.2 In the agreements, localfranchisees.often kno、、・ n as “1ocalbottlers, ” aregranted the
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exclusive right to a territory , and also they have to build their production sites, hire
employees, procure delivery vehicles and other materials, and developlocaI distribution
channels using their own investments in the territory (see figure2). In contrast, Coca -Cola
Company is obligated to transfer its business format and sales promotion programs to
support the business deve1opment of thelocalbottlers. The1ocalbottlers aIso have to
purchase concentrate of the drinks from Coca-Cola Company and, needless to say, it becomes
the main revenue of Coca -Cola Company(Kohno and Murayama, 1997).
The wholesale price of the concentrate includes not only the cost of the concentrate
itself , but also royalties for using the Coca-Cola Company's expertise and trademark. Most
of Coca -Cola Company's revenues are generated from selling the concentrate to the1ocal
bottlers. Thus,if the sales volume(not profit ) o f  the1ocalbottlers expands,the revenue of
Coca -Cola Company also increases. In other words, the financialresult of Coca-Cola
Company is heavily dependent on the sales performance of the1ocalbottlers, such that Coca-
Cola Company has strong incentive to expand the sales volume of the IocaI bottlers.
Franchising is also recognized as the “reciprocalbusiness system” ;franchisers can quick1、,
expand their revenue 、vithout their o、、-n investment for physicalequipment and, in contrast,
franchisees can smoothlylaunch their business relying on the transferred business format.
A “Japanese Coca-Cola bottling system” had been structured by17bottlers and a foreign
subsidiary of Coca-Cola Company until1999(see figure3). In recent years, however, some
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Figure2. Franchise S、stem of Coca-Cola Company
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bottlers, such as Coca -Cola West Japan and Coca-Cola Central Japan, merged with other
bottIers to form “anchor bottlers” in order to share strategic objectives with Coca-Cola
Company, t o  pursue greater economies of scale and scope(FeIstead,1993), and to sustain
competitive advantages against a new strong competitor, Pepsi-Suntory(a Japaneselarge
alcoholic and beverage producer)coalition formed in1997.
The duration of a franchise agreement is basically10 years in Japan. In many cases,it
might be expanded to20 years without renegotiating process. If there are not any serious
violations of the agreement in the previous contractuaI term, the same bottler couldlegally
renew the agreement regarding the same territory(Emerson, 1998).
InternationalStrategy
Coca-Cola Company operates its business system in nearly200 countries (The Coca-
Cola Company, 2001) and has an internationalstrategy to integrate its worldwide operations.
The fundamentals of the internationalstrategy,consisting of “product standardization”and
“localization,”had been formulated by Robert W.Woodruff (known as“The Boss”)in the
1930's and have guided its internationalization process ever since.
The strategy of product standardization exists to maintain the same high quality and the
same flavor of products,“Coca-Cola,”“Sprite, ” “Fanta,”“Mel1o Ye11ow,”“Minute Maid” and
so forth,al lover the world, thus creating a g1oba11y unified brand image of Coca-Cola
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Company and its productsin the huge globalmarket. The corporate brand and product
brands arethe most valuable intangible assets,which vaIue is equivalent to$70.45b加ion in
2003(Reuters News Service. 2003),to generate revenues in Coca-Cola Company. Hence,
Coca-Cola Company places the highest priority on protecting their value.
Localization hasbeen basedon one of Woodruff's credos (Coca-Cola Japan Company,
1987);“A healthy worldeconomy depends on a healthylocaleconomy.” Thus,Coca-Cola
Company organizes businesspartnerships withlocalfranchiseesand the franchiseesprocure
ingredients,containers (bottles and cans),production equipment,delivery vehicles and so on
fromlocalmarkets in order to promote healthylocaleconomies. If the wagelevels and the
living standards risebecausethelocaleconomy is developing,people can afford to purchase
soft drinks including Coca-Cola Company's brands. MoreoverCoca-Cola Company can
expect to avoid hostiIity fromlocalconsumers by promoting friendships withlocaleconomy
and industry.
Controlof Bottlers'0perations
Coca-Cola Company has to controlthelocalbottlers,which produce and distribute
products in eachlocalmarket,to operationa「ize the internationalstrategy well. In this
section,severalcontrolmechanisms of franchising,such as monitoring system,information
system and sharing of benefits,in Japanesemarket are investigated.
Mon,itormg S l'8te m. It is dispensable for product standardization,an essentialpart of
the internationalstrategy,that thelocalbottlers purchase the right concentrate from Coca-
Cola Company,use the right materials approved by Coca-Cola Company,and manufacture
and distribute products usingthe right method. Thus,Coca-Cola Company has a monitoring
system to ensure that thelocalbottlers never deviate from the proper procedure. In the
Japanesemarket,Coca-Cola Japan Company Ltd. (hereil Mfter Coca-Cola Japan),a wholly-
owned foreignsubsidiary of Coca-Cola Company,implements periodicsecret inspections of
fnalproducts in eachlocalbottler's market. After picking up samplesfrom vending
machines,shelves of retailstore and so forthin each bottler's territory,and bringing them to
Coca-Cola Japan's chemicallaboratory,Coca-Cola Japan analyzes their ingredients and
formulas. If alocalbottler violates the technicalconditions spedfied by Coca-Cola Com-
pany,Coca-Cola Japan enforces the bottler to review its manufacturing processand advises
it on corrections. 0 f  course,Coca-Cola Company can terminate the franchiseagreement in
the worst cases. Also,Coca-Cola Japan keepsthe inspectionssecret,especially about when
and where,so that each bottler has to be sensitive to their quality controlat alltimes.
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Even if the strategyof localization describedin textbooks of internationalmanagement
involvesdecentralization of power tolocaI franchisees (Bartlett and Ghoshal,l989;Porter,
1986),it is operationalizedwithcentralized controlpolicy in Coca-Cola Company. For
instance,regarding Iocalprocurement of product materials,thelocalbottlers are never
permitted their own discretion in choosingsuppliers. Coca-Cola Company and Coca-Cola
Japan hold the power toselect suppliers,to examinethe quality of materials produced by the
suppliersand to approve them. In the case of building a new plant,for instance,even if the
localbottlers are obligated to finance al lof  it,they also have to accept detailedtechnical
inspections,implemented by Coca-Cola Japan's technicalstaff,regarding building sites,
quality of water,plantlayout and so on. In other words,Coca-Cola Company can fully
interfere in the production processand quality controlsystem of the new plant owned by the
locaI bottlers without anyfinancialobligations.
Infiormation SUstem. An information system is also indispensable to an effective
contro11ing system. Coca-Cola Company and Coca-Cola Japan have to analyze constantly
incoming information regardinglocalbottlers'behaviors.
“Area MarketingManagers” (herein,after AMMs)have an important role in gathering
information of localbottlers andlinking Coca-Cola Company's strategyto1ocalbottlers'
operations. The AMMs,employedby Coca-Cola Japan,visit thelocalbottlers'offices
severaltimes for a week. Inthis process,theysend thelocalbottlers documentation
regarding Coca-Cola Company's businessplans,product policies,marketing and sales promo-
tions,while simultaneously gathering the information regarding businessplans,performances
and managerialproblems of thelocalbottlers.
The information gatheredbythe AMMs is constantly brought back to Coca-Cola Japan,
and shared and analyzed amongthe departmentsof Coca-Cola Japan,such as the technical
department(including quality controland production),the marketing department and the
“support staff”(regardinglegaland public relation)3,andthensent to Coca-Cola Company's
world headquarters by the useof the internaI“globalinformation system.” For example,
industrialanalystscommentedonthe information system structured by Roberto Goizueta
and Douglas Ivester,who arethe former CEOs of Coca-Cola Company,as follow;“the
company's globalsystem,which gathersbottler data from alloverthe world and is accessible
through the company's information network. The company carefully monitors what is
happening market by market worldwide. Any trendsthat develop are picked up and
projects are monitoredmonthly. 'Having that information system,andseeing from sales
data that thingsaren't goingthe waythey should[in a particular market]-within a week,'
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makes it much easier for the company to jump on a given probIem or opportunity” (Ho11eran,
1996, p. 35). Obviously, Coca-Cola Company not only utilizes the information for contro11ing
bottlers' operations but also uses it in the formation of ne、v business poIicies.
Economi c F1ouls an d S haring, of Benef i ts. Atleast four economic flows between
Coca-Cola Company and the1ocalbottlers can be confirmed(seef igure4).4
Regarding the wholesale purchase of concentrate, as referred to above, the  bottlers are
obligated to purchase concentrate from Coca -Cola Company at a certain price. Thus, since
the dilution rate of concentrate is fixed, the revenue of Coca-Cola Company rises in propor -
tion to expansion of the bottlers' sale volume. The price of concentrate islega11y determined
by Coca-CoIa Con、pany, 、,hiIe it does change due to inflation, currency fluctuation and other
reasonable reasons. Although changing the price is a subject of negotiation between Coca -
Cola Company and the1ocalbottlers, Coca-Cola Company might hold the stronger negotiat -
ing position against the1ocalbottIers because of its monopoly power as the only se11er of
concentrate. A certain portion of the concentrate price, as a consideration for using
valuable brand name and trademark, is transmitted to Coca-Cola's world headquarters
through Coca-Cola Japan.
Regarding the to l lproduct ( see also FeIstead,1993) , thelocaI bottlers are forced to
purchase severalfinished products ca11ed as the to1lproducts,such as “So -K e,1-B i-C11a” ( a
Japanese mixed ready - to-drink t e a ) , “Minute Maid” and so forth, from Coca-Cola Japan.
・10
Figure4. Economic Flows in Coca -Col‘a Business
In this case,thelocalbottlers pay Coca-Cola Japan forthe wholesale price of the toll
products, and then addthe margin and sellthem to retailers or finalconsumers. The pricing
processof the product might be similar tothat of the concentrate.
Regarding the subcontracted products,more complicated than the other deals,Coca-
Cola Japan subcontracts the bottlers,especia1ly who own well-developed facilities, t o
manufacture certain products,such as“So-Ken-B i-Cha.” Subsequently,Coca-Cola Japan
once purchases the productsfrom the bottlers by paying the manufacturing cost,and then
wholesales them,as the to1lproducts, to  the bottlers again. Also,Coca-Cola Japan and the
bottlers sometimes jointly invested in the new production facilitiesfor the subcontracted
products. Needless to say,the differentialbetween the manufacturing cost paid to the
bottlers and the wholesale price of the tollproducts paid by the bottlersbecomesgross profits
of the subcontracted products for Coca-Cola Company and Coca-Cola Japan.
Regarding the sharing of expendituresfor marketing and sales promotions,while Coca-
Cola Company and Coca-Cola Japan arelogically obligatedto fund the nationwide advertise-
ments and sales promotions for enhancing the value of the Coca-Cola's brands themselves,
thelocalbottlers basically supply the funds for regional-based advertisements and sales
promotions. The regionaI marketing and salespromotion expenditures funded by the
bottlers are included in the price of the concentrate,and thus,as the bottlers purchasethe
concentrate,the expendituresare once collectedby Coca-Cola Japan. Subsequently, the
localbottlers are requiredto formulate annuallocalmarketing and salespromotion plansfor
their territories and to budget for thoseplans. Eventually,Coca-Cola Company and Coca-
Cola Japan reallocate funds to each bottler's plan through cost and benefit analysis although
some discretion in thesedecisions might be involved. This means that,even if the expendi-
ture is shared by Coca-Cola Company and the1ocalbottlers,Coca-Cola Company might have
the greater influence on how to useit.
Discussion and Implications
Mechan i8m of Contro l. Felstead (l993,p.203),by investigating Coca-Cola's fran-
chisebusinessin Germany,remarkedthat“inthe case of franchising,economic power is
exercisednot by directly owing and controlling the physicalassets of doing business,but by
controlling the useto which the intangible assets, such as the trade mark/idea/format,are
put.” In addition,this paper attempted to clarify the detailof Coca-Cola's internalcontrol
mechanism. As summarizedinfigure5,Coca-CoIa Company directs Coca-Cola Japan to
monitor tightly the behaviors of thelocalbottlers. Coca-Cola Japan might take responsibil・
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ities for contro11ing the aspects of techno1ogy and product quality, a n d  sharing of benefits
while Coca -Cola Company m ight be obIigated to influence the process of sharing benefits just
by changing the wholesale price of concentrate.
In the internationalfranchise, since the headcluarters islimited to approach1ocalfran -
chisees because of physicaland psycho1ogicaldistance, t he  majority-owned foreign subsidi -
ary,such as Coca-Cola Japan, should play vitalroles to controlthe foreignlocalfranchisees
through closely monitoring instead. Although the controlmechanism, named here as “in -
direct( =non-e(1uity)controlcombined with d i rect ( =equity)controI,”differs from that
based on FDI, it is stilI confirmed that the franchisor(Coca -Cola Company)can effectiveIy
controlthe foreign franchisees(foreign1ocalbottlers)there.
Moreover, it should be emphasized that the wel1-established information system might
constitute the essentials to make the controI mechanism effective. In the case of Coca -Cola
business in Japan, the AMMs hired by Coca-Cola Japan convey the information regarding the
Coca -Cola 's business policies and thelocalbottlers' operations from Coca-Cola Company to
the bottlers and 11'1ce υe;sa. Such human networking based on the AMMs' activites, compar -
ed to the computer-based networl、.ing, holds an advantage to gain verbaland non-verbal
information deeply embedded in the decentralized1ocalbusiness context in which the1ocaI
bottlers operate. Clearly,those kinds of 1ocaI information system are indispensable tol ink
the Coca-Cola's strategy to the1ocalbottlers'implementation, especia1ly in the high-context
.12
Figure5. Mechanism of Controlof Coca -Cola Company in Japan
society, such as Japan ( I-la1land Hall ,1987;0gawa,1999).
As the practicaland managerialimplications for successfu11y controlling of the interna -
tionalfranchise chain, this article might underline that franchisors should organize the 、、.,e11-
operated and majority-o、、ned foreign subsidiaries, as1ocalfranchisors, and then establish the
human-based netvl ,orking, 1ed by the1ocalfranchisors, t o  gain the1ocalinformation.
Del ining t he Boundaries of MNC. As mentioned above, franchising might allo、、,
Coca -Cola Compan、 to controlthe1ocalbottlers effectively. In particular, monitoring
(sampling inspection and approved1ocalprocurement)and the information system(work of
AMMs)through Coca-Cola Japan become key tools of control. In addition, Coca -Cola
Company has an influence on how benefits are shared with thelocalbottlers. Such indirect,
but tight, controlthrough franchising raises a theoretica1 (luestion:whether this entity that
controls foreign business operations through a non-equity mode would be recognized as an
MNC
Under the conventionaltheory, such as advocated by Hymer(1960), this entity would
never be recognized as an M iN'C. The con、,entionaI theory 、、,ouldlead to the interpretation
that Coca -Cola Japan, as a whol]y-o、、,ned subsidiary , is included in the boundaries of the
MNC, b u t  thelocalbottlers (franchisees) are excluded because of thelack of o、vnership
(FDI)l inkage. Mean、、,hile, if the element of controlis emphasized, one is led to different
conclusion. In fact, an effective management cycle of planning, doing and monitoring (see
figu r e6 ) h a s  been established bet、、,een Coca-Cola Compan、 and thelocalbottlers. If one
accepts the premise that the notion of controlis the key in defining what constitutes an
Figure6. Management C、cle and Controlin Coc‘a-Cola Company in Jap‘an
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interna1organization, it  follow that even the Japanese bottlers, as franchisees, are within the
boundaries of the MNC known as Coca-Cola Company(seef igure7).  Eventually, it is
implied that the concept of contro1, especially in the internationalbusiness study, h a ve  to
detach from the f1o、、,・ of FDI, and then it bring internationalbusiness scholars more compre -
hensive interpretation regarding the nature of po、、er and contro1of MIN'Cs.
Conclusion
Globalservice industries, some of them utilizing franchise system to expand their
businesses, are rapidly growing with power and controlin recent years. Not surprisingly,
this movement wi11gradua11ylead to modification of the conventionaldefinition of MNCs.
For instance, Jones (1996, p. 6 ) h a s  already pointed out that “the existence of intermedi -
ate modes bet、、・een e、1porting and 、、'holly -o、、'ned FDI re-inforces the criticalpoint that the
realsignificance o f MNEs is not as an institutionalvehicle for foreign investment.” Also,
Buckley and Casson(1998) have emphasized that new models of the MNC should take
account of the ' flexible boundaries of the firm” and their competitive advantages. Some
other researchers ha、,e alread、,begun the empiricalstudies to investigate effectiveness and
advantages of non-e(luity modes, such as franchising, management contracts andlicensing, as
foreign entry strategies and internationaldistribution channels(Contractor and Kundo, 1998;
ErramilIi et a1.2002) . and the dynamic nature of po、、,er and controlin the international
franc、hise business(Quinn and Doherty. 2000).
This article suggests expanding the organizationalboundaries of MNCs to include non-
e(luity relationships as we11as equity relationships is becoming essentialto understand the
・1・
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realsignificance of MNCs. For instance,the conservativenessof Japanesemarket for
foreignMNCs is sometime critiqued by foreigngovemments mainly based on the statistics
of FDI. However,if the argument had taken account of thepenetration of foreign franchise
businessowned by Japanesefranchisees,such as in fast food and cafe businesses,in Japan
(Hibbert,2003),it mightlead to the opposite conclusion;that is,the opennessof Japanese
market.
Notes
However. the officialcompany name imprintedin the annualreport is“The Coca-Cola Company”. not
“Coca-Cola Company.”
Obviously. Coca-Cola Company doesnot disclosethe fulltext of franchiseagreement for outsiders. A
fewscrapsof the agreement,however. were referredin the interviews withseveral Japaneselocal
bottlers. The interviews were conductedas follows:Chukyo Coca-Cola Bottling (March26. 1996).
Coca-Cola Japan Company (March27,l997),Coca-Cola NationalSalesCompany (March26,l997;
July22. l999),Hokuriku Coca-Cola Bottling (June4. l999),Kinki Coca-Cola Bottling(September8,
l999). Kitakyushu Coca-Cola Bottling(March28-29. 1999) andSendai Coca-Cola Bottling (May2.
l996).
Coca-Cola Japan has never disclosed outsiders its organizationalchart. The organizationalstructure
of Coca-Cola Japan described here is basedon interviews with Coca-Cola NationalSalesCompany
(CCNSC) that  is asalesagent foundedinl995tosellCoca-Cola's products toseveralbig nationwide
retailchain stores.
Based on annualfinancialstatements ofsomelistedIocalbottlers. Chukyo Coca-Cola Bottling. Fuji
Coca-Cola Bottling, Hokkaido Coca-Cola Bottling,Kinki Coca-Cola Bottling. Kitakyushu Coca-Cola
Bottling,MikasaCoca-Cola Bottling. Mikuni Coca-Cola Bottling. Sanyo Coca-Cola Bottling,are
referenced.
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